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[T]he body makes countless demands upon us, and
furthermore any sickness that may befall it hampers our
pursuit of true being. Then too itfills us with desires and
longings and fears and imaginations of all sorts, and such
quantities of trash, that, as the common saying puts it, we
really never have a moment to think about anything
because of the body.
-Plato, Phaedo l
I. APPROACHED BY A DANGEROUS STRANGER
In a large city, it is a common experience: a poorly-dressed
man approaches a tourist, trying to make eye contact. Following
the tourist as he makes his way down a crowded sidewalk, the man
asks if he can talk to the tourist for a moment. In that split second,
the tourist must determine how to react. Is the man dangerous? Is
he simply needy? Perhaps it is just another tourist needing
directions? When we are the tourist, we probably are not aware of
how it is we decide what to do--our decision is predicated on a
complex web of recollections, presumptions, and observations.
Our reaction does not rely on a set of memorized rules or training
we have received, but on instinctual discernment.
This type of gut-level discernment is part of the job description
for federal magistrate judges. At arraignments and initial
appearances, they must evaluate, based solely on what they see and
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hear, the mental competency of the stranger who has approached
the bench and decide whether or not to commit the
stranger/defendant for a competency evaluation. 2 The magistrate
judge must do this without the usual tools of judges: directive
rules, guidelines, laws, and training. Rather, the person in the robe
must rely on her own perceptions-her gut-in deciding whether
or not to detain the defendant to allow for a psychiatric evaluation
to determine competency. This may be the purest application in
the whole of federal law of the simple and personal wisdom we
seek in judges.
In the end, does it matter? After all, the magistrate judge is
usually doing nothing more than committing the defendant to a
hospital prison for a relatively short stay. The short and emphatic
answer is that yes, it does matter. As Professor Rodney Uphoff has
laid out previously,3 such competency evaluations are usually
conducted as part of a hospitalization in a maximum-security
institution with minimal treatment and can subject the defendant to
a far greater deprivation of his liberty than if he were convicted of
the crime with which he is charged.4
The initial decisions of whether to schedule a hearing on
competence and whether or not to commit the defendant for
evaluation are, of course, just the beginning of a much longer
process. If the magistrate so orders, the initial commitment for
evaluation is limited to thirty days, with possibility of a fifteen-day
extension.5 At the conclusion of that commitment, the defendant is
returned to court and a hearing is held on the issue. If the
defendant is found incompetent, he can be committed again for
four months to determine "whether there is a substantial
2. The issue of competence can be raised at any time in the criminal
process and is often described as "competency to stand trial." 18 U.S.C. §
4241(a) (2000). However, it is typically first raised at the initial appearance or
arraignment. Bruce J. Winick, Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial, 32
UCLA L. REv. 921, 924 n.6 (1985).
3. Rodney J. Uphoff, The Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer in
Representing the Mentally Impaired Defendant: Zealous Advocate or Officer of
the Court?, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 65, 71-72 (1988).
4. Similar points had previously been made by Professor .Bruce Winick.
See Winick, supra note 2, at 928-38.
5. 18 U.S.C. § 4247(b) (2000).
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probability that in the foreseeable future he will attain the capacity
to permit the trial to proceed.",6 If at the end of that four months
the court finds there is a substantial probability that the defendant
will become competent, he can be further committed "for an
additional reasonable period of time."
7
The purpose of this article is to analyze this strikingly unique
situation from a very personal standpoint-the decisions one such
magistrate judge has made in three distinct cases that came before
him. While a survey of many magistrates would certainly reveal a
truer picture of the variety of ways this problem may be
approached, our goal here is to allow some depth in describing one
approach, as a way to flesh out the problems inherent in this
function of the magistrate and to start a discussion of a more
systemic way to address the problem of evaluating competency.
Part II of the article will briefly describe the history of the
competency determination and the controlling law that has
resulted. Part III will examine the role of the magistrate judge in
evaluating competency under contemporary standards and contrast
this task with others performed by federal judges. Part IV will
discuss three individual cases and the decisions that were made,
and Part V will set out the challenges this process presents to
fairness, as well as possible remedies to some of those problems.
II. A BRIEF (YET COMPETENT) HISTORY OF COMPETENCE
A. Common Law
Prior to the enactment of a federal competency statute in 1949,
which gave statutory authority to the court to determine
competency at any time,8 the common law provided the court with
this ability.9 In 1899, the Sixth Circuit recognized this commonlaw rule allowing the trial court to bar proceedings against an
6. Id. § 4241(d)(1).
7. Id. § 4241(d)(2).
8. Id. § 4244 (1946 & Supp. IV 1951).
9. Caleb Foote, A Comment on Pre-Trial Commitment of Criminal
Defendants, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 832, 834 (1960).
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insane yerson at arraignment in the case of Youtsey v. United
States:
The statutes of the United States present no mode for the
presentation and trial of an issue of present insanity, when
presented in bar of an arraignment, trial, judgment, or
execution, and we must look to the common law for
guidance in practice. It is fundamental that an insane
person can neither plead to an arraignment, be subjected to
a trial, or, after trial, receive judgment, or after judgment,
undergo punishment.' 1
Further, consistent with current practice, that same common
law rule allowed that "if a person, after committing a crime,
became insane, he was not arraigned during his insanity but was
remitted to prison until such incapacity was removed."'
12
The roots of this doctrine appear to run deep in the law and
were based on the emerging ideal that a defendant must be able to
meaningfully interact with his attorney. 13  Reflecting this,
Blackstone wrote that a madman should not be arraigned "because
he is not able to plead to it with that advice and caution that he
ought.., for how can he make his defense?"'
14
Notably, while it seems clear that this common law power
existed within American law, it is not known how widely it was
employed. Some commentators seem to limit the doctrine to
capital and treason cases, such as Sir Matthew Hale's oft-cited
treatise, which was relied on as authority by the Sixth Circuit in
Youtsey: 1
5
If a man in his sound memory commits a capital offence,
and before his arraignment he becomes absolutely mad, he
ought not by law to be arraigned during such his phrenzy,
but be remitted to prison until that incapacity be removed;
the reason is because he cannot advisedly plead to the
10. Youtsey v. United States, 97 F. 937, 940 (6th Cir. 1899).
11. Id. at940.
12. Crocker v. State, 19 N.W. 435, 436 (Wis. 1884).
13. United States v. Hollis, 569 F.2d 199, 204 (3d Cir. 1977).
14. Id. at 204-05 (quoting William Blackstone, 4 COMMENTARIES 24,
quoted in Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975)).
15. Youtsey, 97 F. at 940.
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indictment; and this holds as well in cases of treason, as
felony .... 16
In 1949, a bill addressing competence was passed by Congress,
and thereafter the federal code expressly allowed for a judge to
find a defendant incompetent.' 7 This law was promoted by the
Federal Bureau of Prisons and the Judicial Conference, largely out
of the concern that considerable numbers of federal prisoners were
determined to be insane for the first time when they reported for
service of their sentences, raising the inference that they had never
been fit for trial. 18 This reasoning, of course, suggests that judges
were not broadly using the authority that was at least, at times,
recognized under the common law.
B. Greenwood v. United States 19 and Jackson v. Indiana2 °
Almost immediately, the new statute was attacked because, on
its face, it seemed to allow for permanent commitment of pretrial
defendants. As one district court held in granting a writ of habeas
corpus, if the statute was valid:
16. Id. (quoting Sir Matthew Hale, 2 THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE
CROWN (1847)).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1952) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) (2000)). The
original language of § 4244 provided, in part, that:
Whenever after arrest and prior to the imposition of sentence or prior to
the expiration of any period of probation the United States Attorney has
reasonable cause to believe that a person charged with an offense
against the United States may be presently insane or otherwise so
mentally incompetent as to be unable to understand the proceedings
against him or properly assist in his own defense, he shall file a motion
for a judicial determination of such mental competency of the accused,
setting forth the ground for such belief with the trial court in which
proceedings are pending. Upon such a motion or upon a similar motion
in behalf of the accused, or upon its own motion, the court shall cause
the accused... to be examined as to his mental condition by at least
one qualified psychiatrist, who shall report to the court. For the
purpose of the examination the court may order the accused committed
for such reasonable period ....
Id. § 4244, quoted in Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 367 n.1 (1956).
18. Foote, supra note 9, at 835.
19. 350 U.S. 366 (1956).
20. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
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[A]n insane person charged with a criminal offense can be
imprisoned for the rest of his life without any trial as to the
issue of whether or not he committed an offense, but only
as to the question of whether or not he was sane or insane
at the time of the hearing.2'
In an attempt to finesse this problem, in 1953 the Tenth Circuit
construed the new statute so that it did not allow for the pretrial
commitment of the permanently insane.22 In that case, a pretrial
defendant was committed to the Medical Center for Federal
Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri for observation and treatment
and for a report on the defendant's condition to be prepared. 3
The defendant was diagnosed as schizophrenic and was returned to
the court with the report that he was incompetent and completely
24
unable to cooperate with counsel. At that point, the defendant
was re-committed until he was made competent or charges were
dropped. The defendant then filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, which the trial court denied.2 On appeal, a panel of the
Tenth Circuit (over a dissent) found that the statute could not be
read to allow for the commitment of the permanently insane as a
proper exercise of federal power and that the statute should be
construed:
[T]o go no further than to make humane provision for the
care and treatment of persons who were temporarily
incompetent at the time of their arrest or who become so
before trial on criminal charges and whose restoration to
competency may be reasonably expected at some time in
the future ....
Three years later, in Greenwood v. United States,27 the
Supreme Court held forcefully to the contrary. Writing for the
Court, Justice Frankfurter held that the commitment of a defendant
21. Dixon v. Steele, 104 F. Supp. 904, 908 (W.D. Mo. 1952).
22. Wells v. Attorney General of the United States, 201 F.2d 556 (10th Cir.
1953).
23. Id. at 557-58.
24. Id. at 558.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 560.
27. 350 U.S. 366 (1956).
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found to be psychotic was "an assertion of authority, duly guarded,
auxiliary to incontestable national power, ' 28 which was plainly
within the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution,29 and
that the "fact that at present there may be little likelihood of
recovery does not defeat federal power to make this initial
commitment of the petitioner." 30  Thus, the Supreme Court
sanctioned the statute's nearly unfettered grant of authority on the
judge who initially encountered the defendant to order him
committed, regardless of the length of confinement for that
stranger who had chanced into court.
Notably, however, the decision in Greenwood limited itself to
the narrow question of federal power and did not address due
process or equal protection. Subsequently, in Jackson v. Indiana,
31
the Supreme Court examined an Indiana statute that made
commitment of pretrial defendants easier than other civil
commitments for insanity.32  The Court held that the Indiana
statute violated both the Equal Protection and the Due Process
Clauses of the Constitution.
33
Noting that the federal statute was "not dissimilar to the
Indiana law," 34 the Jackson Court also expressly imposed new
limitations on federal practice. Specifically, the Court mandated
that:
Without a finding of dangerousness, one committed
thereunder can be held only for a "reasonable period of
time" necessary to determine whether there is a substantial
chance of his attaining the capacity to stand trial in the
foreseeable future. If the chances are slight, or if the
defendant does not in fact improve, then he must be
released or granted a ... hearing.35
28. Id. at 375.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
32. Id. at 727-30.
33. Id. at 730-31.
34. Id. at 731.
35. Id. at 733.
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In reaction to the concerns of Jackson, the current statute was
drafted with specific time limits for pretrial commitments for
mental health issues. The initial commitment for evaluation is
limited to thirty days, with the possibility of a fifteen-day
extension, 36 and the commitment if the defendant is found
incompetent is limited to four months, to determine "whether there
is a substantial probability that in the foreseeable future he will
attain the capacity to permit the trial to proceed. 3 7 If there is no
hope for competence, the defendant is discharged, but if there is
the real possibility of becoming competent, he may further be held
"for an additional reasonable period of time. 3 8 Clearly, the limits
still have some stretch to them.
C. Pate v. Robinson
39
Theodore Robinson shot and killed his eighteen-month-old son,
served less than four months in prison, and then killed his common
law wife, Flossie May Ward. This was part of a lifetime of
bizarre and violent behavior that apparently began when he was hit
on the head with a falling brick when he was about eight years
old.4'
At his trial in Illinois state court, four defense witnesses,
including Robinson's mother, testified that Robinson was insane.42
Nonetheless, Robinson was convicted with no finding of insanity
and was sentenced to life in prison.43
In petitioning for a federal writ of habeas corpus, Robinson
claimed that his due process rights were violated because he "was
denied due process by the state court's failure to conduct a hearing
upon his competence to stand trial,"" and the Supreme Court held
36. 18 U.S.C. § 4247(b) (2000).
37. Id. § 4241(d)(1).
38. Id. § 4241(d)(2).
39. 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
40. Id. at 381.
41. Id. at 378-80.
42. Id. at 383 & n.5.
43. Id. at 384.
44. Id. at 377.
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that the failure to hold such a hearing was, in fact, a violation of
the constitutional right to due process. 45
This new requirement, that the court hold a commitment
hearing, was imposed despite the fact that, though Robinson's
counsel had raised the issue of his sanity, he had never specifically
asked for a hearing on the question of competence. 46 Rather, even
in the absence of a motion by either party, the Court held that it
was the trial court's "failure to make such inquiry" that "deprived
Robinson of his constitutional right to a fair trial. ' 47
Thus, the onus was put on the judge to flag those who are
possibly incompetent and commit them for evaluation, even in the
absence of a motion by the parties.
D. Drope v. Missouri
48
James Drope was convicted in Missouri state court of the rape
(with several other men) of his wife. Prior to trial, Drope's
counsel had moved for a continuance so that Drope could be
examined by a psychiatrist, which was denied by the trial court.
50
Midway through the trial, Drope shot himself in the abdomen, but
the trial continued through his conviction without his being
present.
51
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that
together with other known facts, "petitioner's suicide attempt
created a sufficient doubt of his competence to stand trial to
require further inquiry on the question."
5
For the purposes of our examination of the role of the modem
magistrate, the importance of Drope is that it reiterated the
emphasis in Pate v. Robinson53 on the judge as the principal
45. Id. at 377-78.
46. Id. at 384.
47. Id. at 385.
48. 420 U.S. 162 (1975).
49. Id. at 164-66.
50. Id. at 165. It appears that Drope had already received a short
continuance but that it was not adequate to arrange for a psychiatric
examination.
51. Id. at 166-67.
52. Id. at 180.
53. 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
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evaluator of the defendant's competence 54 and firmly established
the two-part definition of competence, which is discussed in Part
III, infra.
E. Sell v. United States
55
Charles Sell, a practicing dentist in Missouri, suffered a sad
decline into mental illness, which culminated in a series of
hospitalizations triggered at various times by his report that the
gold he used for fillings had been contaminated by communists 56
and that a leopard was outside of his office boarding a bus.57
After several years of such behavior, Sell was charged with
submitting fictitious insurance claims. 5
8
Upon Sell's arrival in federal court, a magistrate judge ordered
a psychiatric examination but subsequently found Sell competent.59
Sell was then indicted on additional charges, re-examined at the
Medical Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri, and
found by the magistrate to now be incompetent. 60
Having found Sell incompetent, the magistrate ordered Sell
hospitalized for treatment, and Sell was returned to Springfield.6'
While there, the staff sought permission to administer medication
over Sell's objections, and such forcible medication was
authorized in part for the purpose of making Sell competent to
stand trial.62
Sell's challenge to the forcible administration of medication
ultimately made it to the Supreme Court. There, the majority held
that such forcible administration of drugs is allowable if the
treatment is medically appropriate, 63 is substantially unlikely to
54. 420 U.S. at 172-73.
55. 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
56. Id. at 169.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 170.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 170-71.
61. Id. at 171.
62. Id. at 171-72.
63. Id. at 179. The question of what is "medically appropriate" is
complex when, for example, the point of the therapy is to allow the patient to
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have side effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial, and
is necessary to further the government's important interest in a
trial.64
In short, the development of common, statutory, and case law
has led us to the present day, in which magistrate judges have the
ability to commit defendants for an evaluation of competence,
65
even if that commitment is for long (but reasonable) periods66 and
requires forcible medication;67 in which a hearing on competency
is called for if there is a question regarding the defendant's mental
state; 68 and-perhaps most importantly-in which it is the judge's
job to discern which defendants require further inquiry, including
commitment for evaluation, even if neither party moves for such
commitment.
69
III. THE ROLE OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE IN ASSESSING
COMPETENCY
A. The Powers of the Magistrate Judge
While competence can be questioned before any federal
judge,7° very often it is initially raised before a magistrate judge,
simply because it is the magistrate judge who first sees the
defendant in the courtroom, either at the initial appearance 7 1 or the
arraignment.
72
be executed. See Douglas Mossman, Is Prosecution "Medically
Appropriate"?, 31 NEw ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 15 (2005).
64. Sell, 539 U.S. at 179.
65. 18 U.S.C § 4241(d) (2000).
66. Id.
67. Sell, 539 U.S. 166.
68. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) (2000).
69. Id. ("The court shall grant the motion, or shall order such a hearing on
its own motion, if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may
presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect .... ).
70. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) refers simply to the "court" rather than to a
specifically empowered judge in discussing the initial determination of
referring a case for a competency evaluation. Id.
71. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a)(1) specifically refers to a
defendant being brought "without unnecessary delay before a magistrate
2007]
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Over the past several decades, the powers of the magistrate
judge have grown, so that in the present day she may not only
conduct initial appearances and arraignments but rule on detention
and bond,73 try and sentence cases involving misdemeanors,74
make rulings or recommendations on many pre- and post-trial
matters in felony cases,7 5 conduct plea hearings in felony cases, 76
and hear any aspect of a civil case if designated by the district
court and if the parties consent to that designation.77
While some have seen the increased power of magistrate
judges and other Article I tribunals as a source of "difficulties, 78 it
has not drawn the magistrate judge away from her core duty of
performing initial appearances and arraignments. 79 It is within this
traditional role of the federal magistrate judge that the question of
competency would most likely present itself, usually in the form of
an unruly, unresponsive, or uncontrollable stranger in the
courtroom.
B. The Process of Ordering a Competency Evaluation
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 5 and 10, which describe
the process of initial appearance and arraignment, respectively, do
not expressly address the need to assess competence. Rather, this
judge," though Rule 5(c) allows for other judges to perform this function. See
FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a)(1) & (c).
72. FED. R. CRIM. P. 10(a).
73. 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(2) (2000).
74. Id. § 636(a)(3). In cases involving Class A misdemeanors, the parties
must consent to trial before the magistrate judge. Id. § 636(a)(5).
75. Id. § 636 (b)(1)(A) & (B).
76. Some circuit courts have found statutory authority for this process
under the somewhat vague language (referring to "additional duties") of 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(3). Five of those circuits require that this be done in the form
of a report and recommendation to the district court. Durwood Edwards, Can
a U.S. District Judge Accept a Felony Plea with a Magistrate Judge's
Recommendation?, 46 S. TEX. L. REv. 99-100 & n. 1 (2004).
77. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (2000).
78. James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the
Judicial Power of the United States, 118 HARv. L. REv. 643, 775 (2004).
79. Of course, there is no other judge in the federal system to whom this
function could be delegated downward.
762 [Vol. 67
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requirement comes from the U.S. Constitution because (as the
Supreme Court has described it) "the failure to observe procedures
adequate to protect a defendant's right not to be tried or convicted
while incompetent to stand trial deprives him of his due process
right to a fair trial." 80
18 U.S.C. § 4241, in turn, directs the magistrate judge to make
two discrete decisions if competence is brought into question: first,
whether or not to schedule a hearing on competency,T and second,
whether or not to commit the defendant for evaluation prior to that
hearing. 82 It is these two initial impact decisions-which would
normally be made together and based on the same facts-with
which we are concerned here.
83
18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) does not provide the magistrate judge very
much guidance in considering whether or not to schedule a
hearing. It simply says that such a hearing should be ordered "if
there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may
presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering
him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to
understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against
him or to assist properly in his defense."
84
Similarly, 18 U.S.C. § 4241(b) simply provides that the court
"may order that a psychiatric or psychological examination of the
defendant be conducted.... ,8 5 In connection with this evaluation,
federal law expressly allows for an involuntary commitment "for a
reasonable period, but not to exceed thirty days .... "86
Thus, simply based on the magistrate judge's sense of
"reasonable cause," the defendant can be involuntarily committed
for up to a month for a series of tests in a prison hospital. As
discussed in the following sections, this decision is made without
the benefit of training or directive standards regarding mental
80. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975) (citing Pate v. Robinson,
383 U.S. 375 (1966)).
81. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) (2000).
82. Id. § 4241(b).
83. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) separately allows for commitment of the
defendant after the hearing, if he is found not to be competent. Id. § 4241(d).
84. Id. § 4241(a).
85. Id. § 4241(b).
86. Id. § 4247(b).
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health. In short, it is little more than the same evaluation we each
may make of the raggedy stranger who approaches us on the street.
C. Training and Standards
1. The Absence of Training on Mental Illness
Magistrate judges receive little in the way of mental illness
training.87 A few law schools offer courses or seminars on mental
illness in the law, but law schools are not in the habit of teaching
psychology or the signs of mental illness. Likewise, magistrate
judges are not provided with materials regarding mental illness or
which behaviors may compel further investigation into a
defendant's mental condition. Instead, magistrate judges must rely
on their own experiences and judgment of what a "normal,"
competent defendant acts like, versus a defendant who exhibits
potentially "abnormal" behavior and may be incompetent to stand
trial.
2. Standards Used in Assessing the Need for Commitment
As set out above,88 the magistrate judge must make two
discrete decisions in assessing the competency issues of a
defendant appearing in court for the first time-first, she must
decide whether to docket a hearing, and second whether to commit
the defendant to a prison hospital for a competency evaluation.
89
While there is a somewhat unhelpful two-part test for making the
first decision set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a), no guidance is
provided in making the second (and perhaps more significant)
decision.
In 1975, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed, in Drope v.
Missouri, a two-part test for competence (or, seemingly, the need
for a competency hearing)91 that was originally set out in the 1960
87. The authors confirmed the lack of mental illness training with the
Magistrate Judges Division as of the date of this article's publication.
88. See discussion supra Part III.B.
89. See id.
90. 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975).
91. Id. at 162.
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case of Dusky v. United States.92 Under that standard, a defendant
is competent if: (1) the defendant "has sufficient present ability to
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding"; and (2) "has a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him."93 This standard has
now been codified at 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a), which directs that the
court grant a motion for a competency hearing if "there is reasonable
cause to believe" 94 that the defendant "may presently be suffering
from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent
to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and
consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in
his defense."
95
The standard set out in § 4241 (a) has some inherent problems in
the context of the decision of whether or not to schedule a
competency hearing. At a most basic level, it involves
determinations best left to experts, whose expertise is not available,
of course, until the competency hearing itself. Further, the §
4241(a) standard relies on an analysis of the attorney-client
relationship, which is generally shielded from the view of the court
by the duty of the defense attorney to maintain the confidentiality of
those communications. The attorney-client relationship is
implicated because the standard requires the defendant to be able to
assist to a reasonable extent with his own defense, and in order to be
found competent, an evaluation of this ability must be made.
In a practical sense, the person best situated to determine
whether the defendant is able to assist to any extent with his own
defense is defense counsel. While defense counsel cannot provide
sworn testimony regarding the defendant's competence at a
competency hearing, and therefore will never be subject to cross-
examination by the prosecution involving her interaction with the
defendant, she does have to report difficulties in communicating
with her client at an earlier stage if she feels that competence may be
92. 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
93. Drope, 420 U.S. at 172 (citing Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402,
402 (1960)).
94. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) (2000).
95. Id.
2007]
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an issue. 96 In addition, if defense counsel makes a motion for an
examination of the defendant's competency to stand trial, she must
set forth, in general terms, why she feels her client's competence is
at issue, with a supporting affidavit. Counsel's affidavit may
describe conversations or interactions she has had with the
defendant in varying degrees of detail, which would normally be
shielded by the attorney-client privilege. The problem here is that
defense counsel essentially must balance a possible competence
issue against a violation of the attorney-client privilege in
determining whether to make such a motion based on what is most
likely to help the defendant.
IV. CASE STUDIES
A. Evaluating a (Potentially) Incompetent Stranger
An initial appearance is a common occurrence in the courtroom
of a magistrate judge. The judge enters her courtroom following
the familiar command that "all rise" and is seated at the bench.
One or more criminal defendants are called to stand before her.
They may be dressed in prison-issued inmate uniforms of orange
or blue, or more traditional black and white stripes, or even dressed
in their own blue jeans and Nikes. Regardless of attire, they all
wear a heavy chain around their waist, to which their left wrist is
cuffed, leaving the right cuff dangling in front of them and their
right hand free for oath-taking. U.S. marshals keep close watch
over them. Counsel is rarely present at an initial appearance. The
courtroom deputy gives them the oath, to which they swear
collectively.
Addressing the group, the judge introduces herself and explains
the purpose of the hearing and the rights of the defendants. She
requires each defendant to acknowledge his understanding of the
proceeding and of his rights in turn. After each defendant has done
so, he is asked by the judge to give his full name, his age, and how
far he went in school. The judge pays close attention to each
96. United States v. Battle, 264 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1175 (N.D. Ga. 2003),
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defendant's answer; if he fails to state his middle name, or gives
only a middle initial, then the judge will follow up with him, as
this may be a sign, albeit a small one, that he is not fully grasping
the proceedings. Along with a failure to state a middle name, or
giving an initial rather than a full name, the judge will look for
clues in the defendant's answer as to his level of education. If a
defendant does not have a high school diploma, the judge will
inquire whether he obtained a G.E.D. (General Educational
Development degree). Ascertaining that the defendant has
achieved the equivalent of a high school diploma may dispel
questions as to whether a defendant has the minimal intelligence
required to understand the proceedings and to assist his counsel. If
the defendant has completed little or no high school level
curriculum, the judge will take special care with her evaluation.
Once the judge has heard from each defendant as to his name,
age, and level of education, and has satisfied herself that the
defendant possesses minimal intelligence and grasps the
proceedings at hand, she inquires whether any defendant currently
suffers from any mental or physical condition that impacts his
ability to understand the proceedings. Once each defendant has
answered, the judge follows up by asking whether any defendant is
currently under the influence of any drug or alcohol that may
impact his ability to understand the proceedings. During this
questioning, the judge must pay close attention to each defendant,
as she will weigh each one's verbal and non-verbal
communications to determine whether the defendant's competence
to stand trial is in question.
Once the judge is satisfied that a defendant is competent to
understand the current proceedings and to stand trial, she advises
each defendant of the charges against him and the possible range
of punishment that would accompany each charge if he were
convicted. Finally, the defendants are asked whether they have
any further questions for the judge.
The ask-and-answer format of the initial appearance is meant
to be an active dialogue between the defendants and the judge and
it comprises the entirety of the judge's first-hand interaction with,
and observation of, a defendant-provided, of course, that it is the
defendant's first time before this judge and that he is not a repeat
visitor. This brief interview forms the bulk of the judge's opinion
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as to whether the competence of the defendant bears further
investigation. As previously mentioned, magistrate judges do not
receive extensive training in psychology, nor do they receive
training materials to guide them in discerning competence; instead,
like a tourist on a New York City street confronted with a
potentially dangerous stranger, a magistrate judge must rely on her
"instinctual discernment" of whether a defendant's competence to
stand trial is at issue. Included below are transcripts from the
initial appearances of three defendants who were referred for
psychiatric evaluation by Magistrate Judge Manske in the Western
District of Texas, Waco Division. A brief discussion of each
interaction follows its respective transcript.
B. Defendant A 97
1. Transcript
Court Clerk: Would you raise your right hand, please?
Defendant A: [No response.]
A's counsel: Raise your right hand.
Defendant A: [No response.]
Judge Manske: Mr. [Defendant A], good afternoon. My name
is Judge Manske. I am the United States Magistrate Judge for the
Western District of Texas sitting in the Waco Division. This is a
preliminary hearing called an initial appearance. It's called an
initial appearance because it is your first time to appear in court
before a judge on these charges since you have been arrested. The
purpose of an initial appearance is for me to advise you of your
constitutional and statutory rights, including your right to retain
counsel. Also, it is to advise you of the charges pending against
you and to let you know when there might be a hearing to
determine whether or not you should be released pending further
proceeding. At this time, it would be appropriate for you to raise
your right hand and respond to the oath as administered by the
clerk of court. Let me advise you that failure to cooperate in this
regard can result in the court finding you in contempt of court and
97. The names of the defendants discussed here have been changed, along




ordering your incarceration throughout the proceedings, so it is in
your best interest to cooperate. Do you understand?
Defendant A: The legal help I have requested has not arrived.
Judge Manske: Alright, I understand that in response to your
request, we contacted [a certain defense counsel]-is that whom
you retained?
Defendant A: Yes, sir.
Judge Manske: We contacted [that certain defense counsel],
and he informed the Court that he had been retained by you on
other matters but, however, was not retained on this particular
proceeding. He said that until he was retained on this particular
proceeding, he would not be coming forward to represent you.
Defendant A: That's because I have not been able to use the
telephone.
Judge Manske: I'll permit you the opportunity to use the
telephone to contact him after this hearing. And additionally, if he
does sign on to be your attorney, I will be happy to grant a motion
to permit him to substitute in for [the attorney who is here today].
I have appointed [this attorney] to represent you because it came to
my attention that you were not cooperating with the pretrial
services officers. You understand that?
Defendant A: They said I had the right to remain silent.
Judge Manske: And I'm going to advise you of that here
shortly, too, but you also have an obligation to respond to the
instructions and directions of the Court, and I am not going to ask
you to say anything to incriminate you. And, let me tell you that
you do have the right to remain silent. You are not required to
speak to any law enforcement officers about the charges pending
against you. If you start to speak to anyone from law enforcement
about these charges, you can stop at any time. You simply don't
have to speak to them if you don't want to. The reason I am telling
you this is because if you do say anything to any law enforcement
officers about these charges, anything you tell them can, and
probably will, be used against you in a future proceeding.
Additionally, anything you say here in court today could be used
against you in a future proceeding, as well. I am not asking you to
incriminate yourself in any way. I would merely like you to take
the oath agreeing to tell the truth in this particular proceeding, and
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I am going to ask the clerk of court to administer that oath one
more time.
Court Clerk: Raise your right hand, please.
Defendant A: Sir, what is your name?
Judge Manske: Jeff Manske.
Defendant A: Okay. I was not told that I was going to have to
be sworn in and, uh, have a [hearing] as I am not prepared for it
and I do not have my requested help.
Judge Manske: Alright, Mr. [Defendant A], I am not going to
ask you anything that will incriminate you. I am merely going to
ask you to identify yourself. I am going to ask you some other
very basic questions, but nothing having to do with this particular
offense or the charges against you. The Court is here to protect
your rights.
Defendant A: Sir, you are law enforcement.
Judge Manske: No, I am not law enforcement-I'm a judge.
There is a difference.
Defendant A: Yes, you are law enforcement, and so I will not
be able to, um, [he whispers to his counsel] ... I cannot let this get
snowball... It has already snowballed out of control.
Judge Manske: Alright, Mr. [Defendant A], are you going to
cooperate with the Court and agree to be sworn in here today?
Defendant A: Not today, sir. It's, uh, not ready.
Judge Manske: Alright, I am going to give [Defendant's
counsel] an opportunity to confer with you to let you know what
your particular options are. I am going to caution you that I am
going to hold you in contempt of court for failing to comply with
the Court's instructions if you do fail to cooperate. I'll give you a
few moments to visit with your attorney, if you'd like.
A's counsel: Alright
Judge Manske: [Defendant A], I would like you to pay
attention, if you would, to this hearing, as well. This is going to be
a very similar hearing to what I am going to have with you, and
that way you can see the type questions that the Court will be
inquiring of you. [The Court proceeds with, and completes,
another defendant's hearing.]
Judge Manske: [Defendant's counsel], do you need a few more
moments, or have you reached an impasse?
A's counsel: Maybe just one more minute.
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Judge Manske: Alright. [A few moments pass.] Alright,
[Defendant's counsel], where are we, sir?
A's counsel: Your Honor, he is not able to render a legal
determination as to whether he understands the allegations against
him. He has ... he did want me to tell the Court that he has asked
for his attorney three different times. He thinks that he has
retained [that particular attorney], and, uh, he does not accept me at
this time as his attorney, and so, uh, that is essentially where we
are at this time.
Judge Manske: Very well, if you will return your client to the
lectern. [Defendant A], the Court notes your attorney's comments,
although you don't recognize him as your attorney for the record.
Once again I will state that we contacted [that particular attorney],
and he indicated that he has not been retained on this particular
matter. However, I will ask the marshals to give you an
opportunity to make a collect call to [his] office at the conclusion
of this hearing. [Then, the judge proceeded to advise Defendant A
of the charge against him and the possible punishment range for
that crime.] Do you understand the charge against you and the
range of punishment? Are you still refusing to speak?
Defendant A: I do not understand your foreign language.
Judge Manske: Alright, the Court has before it a motion for
pretrial psychiatric examination submitted by the government.
Based upon what is contained in this particular motion, as well as
your behavior here in court today, the Court has a question as to
whether or not you are competent to proceed in these particular
proceedings. As such, I am going to order a psychiatric
examination to determine whether or not you are competent to
understand the nature and the consequences of the proceedings
against you and to assist properly in your defense. I have signed
that order. Pending the outcome of that particular evaluation, I
will defer my ruling on contempt; however, I will advise you that
we will have a hearing after the receipt of that and will proceed
further at that time. I do want to advise you that you do have the
right to be represented by counsel of your own choosing in these
proceedings, and if you can't afford an attorney, I will be happy to
appoint one for you as I have done with [the attorney who is here
today]. Out of an abundance of caution, and as I mentioned, you
do have the right to consult with your attorney before questioning
2007]
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by any law enforcement and you also have the right to have your
attorney present during any questioning. I am going to set this
matter for a preliminary exam and detention hearing. Any
questions?
Defendant A: I do.
Judge Manske: Yes?
Defendant A: [Defendant A refers to the judge as something
undecipherable], are you aware that regardless of the outcome or
supposed outcome of this, uh, mental incarceration that [inaudible-
but something like, "whether they have information that is accurate
or not"], I was not informed . . . there was no post or release
instructions. I was not informed that I would have to make any
changes. I was not informed that I was a mental incompetent, and
I have no paperwork stating that. And, I was not informed that I
would have to make any changes in my lifestyle...
Judge Manske: I do want to advise you as I had advised you
previously...
Defendant A: [Still talking and trying to interrupt.]
Judge Manske: One moment. Let me advise you as I had
advised you previously that anything you say here in court today
can be used against you in a future proceeding, and I would
caution [your attorney] to consult with you before you make any
further statements and that you receive his approval before making
any further statement to the Court. We'll give you an opportunity
to make any such statements that you would like to make, but I am
going to ask that you first confer with your attorney in that regard.
[A few moments pass.]
A's counsel: We've conferred, Your Honor. He has nothing
further he would like to say.
Judge Manske: Very well. The Court will stand in recess.
2. Discussion
In the case of Defendant A, Magistrate Judge Manske had the
benefit of a motion from the government before the defendant
came before the court for an initial appearance. That motion set
out Defendant A's behavior at the time of his arrest and requested
a competency examination. While such a motion is important in
flagging for the court potential defendants whose competency may
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be in question, it was Defendant A's in-court behavior that
convinced Judge Manske to order a psychiatric evaluation.
Several separate behaviors, taken both individually and
collectively in this case, clearly indicated a defendant who may not
"ha[ve] sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding" and who does not
"ha[ve] a rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against him."98 In other words, Judge Manske had
"reasonable cause to believe [that the defendant was] suffering
from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally
incompetent to the extent that he [was] unable to understand the
nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist
properly in his defense," 99 and therefore ordered a psychiatric
evaluation of Defendant A. These behaviors can be classified as:
(1) failure to cooperate with courtroom personnel; (2) refusal to
accept court-appointed counsel and to understand that he had not
retained counsel to assist him in this case; (3) failure to respond
intelligibly to the judge's questions; (4) failure to understand the
judge's role in the proceeding or generally; and (5) failure to
understand the charges against him.
Aside from the government's motion, the first sign Judge
Manske had that Defendant A's competence was in question was
his failure to cooperate with the courtroom deputy by raising his
right hand to take the oath. This was not the product of
questioning by the judge but rather something he observed that was
far from ordinary. While a failure to cooperate with courtroom
personnel may appear to be an act of simple defiance, it is quite
rare and should immediately draw the judge's attention. When
Defendant A had failed to respond to the courtroom deputy, as well
as his attorney's instruction to raise his right hand, Judge Manske
got involved and explained that it was in Defendant A's best
interest to cooperate, rather than to be held in contempt of court
and incarcerated throughout the pretrial period. Despite extensive
dialogue with the judge and with counsel during which he was
repeatedly reassured that he would not have to speak about the
charges against him, Defendant A never consented to being sworn
98. Drope, 420 U.S. at 172.
99. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) (2000).
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in, instead responding to the courtroom deputy's second attempt at
swearing him by asking Judge Manske, "Sir, what is your name?"
and making statements like "I cannot let this get snowball ... It
has already snowballed out of control."
The second indication that Judge Manske had that this
particular defendant may not be competent to stand trial was
Defendant A's repeated insistence that he had retained a particular
attorney to represent him and his refusal to accept the attorney that
was provided for him at the initial appearance. During his initial
appearance, Judge Manske explained to Defendant A that he had
not retained his chosen attorney for this matter but that he could do
so following the initial appearance and that if Defendant A's
chosen attorney did agree to represent him, the judge would allow
that attorney to substitute for the one appointed by the court. None
of this appeased Defendant A. Even after Judge Manske allowed
him to observe another defendant's appearance and to discuss the
situation with his court-appointed attorney, Defendant A still
maintained that he had asked for his attorney three different times
and been denied, and that he would not accept the court-appointed
attorney as his counsel. His failure to cooperate with the court-
appointed attorney, as well as his erratic responses to Judge
Manske's questioning, demonstrated that he might not be able to
assist in his own defense.
Several other unresponsive statements made by Defendant A
also gave some insight into his mental condition and showed that it
was unlikely that he understood the purpose of that particular
proceeding, as well as his rights. He responded to Judge Manske's
question whether he was still refusing to speak by saying, "I do not
understand your foreign language." In addition, Defendant A
made a lengthy statement that the judge interrupted, which
included the statements, "I was not informed that I was a mental
incompetent, and I have no paperwork stating that. And, I was not
informed that I would have to make any changes in my lifestyle."
Judge Manske interrupted Defendant A's speech and again advised
him of his right to remain silent regarding the charges against him.
100. While it is unusual for a defendant to have an attorney present during an
initial appearance, Judge Manske appointed counsel in this case due to
Defendant A's refusal to cooperate with pretrial services.
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As Defendant A began discussing his case and making longer,
more inflammatory statements to the court, it became clearer still
that the defendant did not understand his rights.
Defendant A also did not grasp the role of a judge either in this
proceeding or generally. He referred to Judge Manske as "law
enforcement" and improperly asserted his right to remain silent
and to refuse to cooperate with the court. In addition, he asked
impertinent questions to the judge such as, "Sir, what is your
name?" (Judge Manske had already introduced himself by name at
the beginning of the proceeding after Defendant A refused to take
the oath.)
Defendant A was unable to understand the charges against him.
In addition to statements that Judge Manske could evaluate first-
hand, the court-appointed attorney also stated that Defendant A
was "not able to render a legal determination as to whether he
understands the allegations against him." Defendant A refused to
respond to Judge Manske's question whether he understood the
charges against him and their potential range of punishment.
C. Defendant B
1. Transcript
Judge Manske: Good afternoon. Could each of you please
state your full name for the record?
Defendant B: [The Defendant answered with his first and last
names.]
Judge Manske: How far did you go in school?
Defendant B: About sixth grade.
Judge Manske: Do you know what a G.E.D. is?
Defendant B: No, sir, not at the time.
Judge Manske: Alright, do you know what a G.E.D. is?
Defendant B: Yes.
Judge Manske: Have you taken a graduate equivalency exam?
Defendant B: No, sir.
Judge Manske: Do you suffer from any physical or mental
condition that might affect your ability to understand what we are
doing here?
Defendant B: Yes, sir, I do.
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Judge Manske: Alright, sir, what would that be?
Defendant B: Well, I can't think clearly.
Judge Manske: Alright, other than not being able to think
clearly, have you ever been diagnosed with any type of
psychological condition?
Defendant B: Yes, sir, uh, I supposed to be, uh, I change into
different person. Uh, uh, I got two personalities.
Judge Manske: Alright, are you taking any medication for
that?
Defendant B: Yes, sir. I'm up on the M.H.M.R. [Mental
Health Mental Retardation program].
Judge Manske: Alright, I'm going to order a psychiatric
evaluation to see whether or not Mr. [Defendant B] can assist his
attorney in the defense of this matter. Do you understand your
right to remain silent?
Defendant B: Yes, sir.
Judge Manske: [At this time, the judge advised him of the
charge against him and explained the possible range of
punishment.] Do you understand the charge and the punishment
you are facing?
Defendant B: Yes, sir.
Judge Manske: Alright, tell me what you are charged with.
Defendant B: I can't.
Judge Manske: Alright, you don't know why you are here in
court?
Defendant B: No, sir. Right now I don't.
Judge Manske: [The judge then advised the Defendant of his
rights, and the Court stood in recess.]
2. Discussion
Defendant B's case was fairly straightforward as there were
several indicia of his inability to understand the proceedings
against him. These indicia can be classified as: (1) minimal
education; (2) affirmative response to the question whether he has
a physical or mental condition that would impair his understanding
of the proceedings with an explanation thereof; and (3) inability to





Judge Manske: Good afternoon, folks. Could you please state
your full name for the record and tell me your current age and how
far you went in school? If you didn't graduate from high school,
let me know your last grade completed and whether or not you
have a G.E.D.
Defendant C: [The Defendant stated his full name.] I
graduated from, um, college, Mary-Hardin Baylor.
Judge Manske: And how old are you, sir?
Defendant C: Fifty-one years old.
Judge Manske: Do you suffer from any physical or mental
condition that might affect your ability to understand what we're
doing here today?
Defendant C: I'm not sure after talking with one of the
attorneys.
[Defendant's counsel interjected that, based on his
conversation with the Defendant and on conversations with the
Defendant's son and mother, he was going to be filing a motion
that morning for a psychiatric evaluation prior to proceeding with a
detention hearing and arraignment.]
Judge Manske: Very well, that motion will be granted when it
is received. Mr. [Defendant C], if at any time you don't
understand something that I tell you during this hearing, please let
me know and I will be happy to explain it to you in greater detail.
I'll also give you an opportunity to confer with your attorney. Do
you understand?
Defendant C: Yes, sir.
Judge Manske: [The judge then advised Defendant C of the
purpose of the hearing and advised him of his rights, and he asked
him if he understood.]
Defendant C: Yes.
Judge Manske: [The judge advised him of the charge against
him and the possible range of punishment.] Do you understand the
charge that's been made against you?
Defendant C: Yes.
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Judge Manske: And do you understand the range of
punishment?
Defendant C: Yes.
Judge Manske: Do you have any questions about either?
Defendant C: No.
Judge Manske: [The judge then advised Defendant C of his
rights.] And, Mr. [Defendant C], you are going to be detained at
this time, pending the examination referenced by your attorney.
Do you understand your rights as I've explained them to you?
Defendant C: Yes, Your Honor.
Judge Manske: Do you have any questions about anything that
we've discussed?
Defendant C: No.
Judge Manske: Very well. [The Court stood in recess.]
2. Discussion
Defendant C's counsel made a preliminary assessment of
competence prior to his initial appearance before Judge Manske.
By discussing his concerns with Defendant C's family, he was able
to identify grounds upon which to base a motion for a competency
hearing, which the judge agreed would be granted upon receipt.
Aside from counsel's concerns, which were communicated to
Defendant C, and then by him to Judge Manske when he was
asked whether there was any physical or mental condition that
would impair his understanding of the proceedings, Defendant C
was able to comport himself appropriately at his initial appearance,
even answering that he understood his rights and the charges
against him in the affirmative. Without his counsel's intervention,
Defendant C's competence may not have been further investigated,
as there was no immediate indication that it was in question. This
type of initiative by defense counsel can serve defendants very
well, as counsel may have a better opportunity to speak with a
defendant outside the courtroom and can follow up with friends
and relatives and determine whether there are issues that bear




V. CHALLENGES TO THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF DISCERNING A
DEFENDANT'S COMPETENCE
A. Current Resources for Determining if Competency Is at Issue
As demonstrated by the case studies presented in Part IV, there
are a few different ways that a question as to a defendant's
competence to stand trial may be raised at an early stage. The
prosecutor may raise it, defense counsel may raise it, the court may
raise it on its own initiative, and the defendant himself can raise it.
The earliest opportunity for any preliminary evaluation of a
defendant's competence is during his arrest, which information the
prosecutor will receive. The second chance for early evaluation is
the interview with pretrial services, the results of which will be
passed along to the court. The third-but much more rare-
opportunity for such preliminary evaluation may occur if and when
the defendant meets with counsel prior to his initial appearance.
This usually only occurs if the defendant has retained his own
counsel, rather than relying on the court to appoint counsel for
him. The final and most certain of these initial evaluations is the
initial appearance itself, during which the judge can evaluate
firsthand whether there is any question as to a defendant's
competence that would warrant further exploration, while also
considering additional factors, if any have been raised, such as the
defendant's behavior at the time of arrest, his interaction with
pretrial services, and his interaction with his attorney.
1. Federal Pretrial Services Report
The pretrial services report contains information about a
defendant's background, which may include criminal history,
physical and mental health, education, family history, marital
status, and the like. This information may be confirmed by the
pretrial services officer through telephonic interviews of the
defendant's family members and friends. The pretrial services
officer relays this information to the court via an informal
conference immediately prior to the defendant's initial appearance.
As demonstrated by the case study of Defendant A, a defendant's
interaction with the pretrial services officer, such as failure to
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cooperate with the officer, or an inability to accurately respond to
questions, can signify a potential competence issue, which the
officer will likely bring to the court's attention. Similarly, a
defendant's behavior during his arrest may prompt the government
prosecutor to file a motion requesting an evaluation as well.
2. Attorney Observation and Motion
An initial evaluation of a defendant's competence by his
counsel will often be unavailable prior to the initial appearance, as
counsel for an indigent defendant is usually not assigned by the
court until the defendant's financial affidavit has been received and
the defendant has made his initial appearance. There are rare
cases, however, in which a defendant retains his own counsel, or
based on information provided by the prosecuting attorney or
pretrial services officer, the court appoints counsel to represent the
defendant at his initial appearance. Even in these rare
circumstances in which a defendant has counsel present for his
initial appearance, it is rarer still that the defendant will have met
with his attorney to any meaningful extent before the initial
appearance.
In the very rare circumstances where an attorney has the
opportunity to observe the defendant in a meaningful way prior to
the initial appearance, the attorney may be in the best position to
notice whether the defendant's competence is in question. It is
unlikely that defense counsel would improperly raise the question
of competence and suggest pretrial detention for a competency
evaluation without good cause. This situation is best shown by the
case study of Defendant C, where Defendant C had retained
counsel who questioned Defendant C's competence and who was
able to follow up with Defendant C's family members as to his
mental capacity and to file a motion with the court requesting a
psychiatric evaluation. In that case, the role of counsel was
invaluable in flagging a potential competency issue for the court,
which may have gone unnoticed if the court relied solely on
Defendant C's initial appearance, as he was able to comport
himself appropriately at the appearance and rendered intelligible
answers to the judge's questions, even stating that he understood
his rights and the charges against him. The attorney was in a better
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position than the judge in that case to discern whether competency
might be at issue, as he had met extensively with the defendant and
discussed the defendant with his family members prior to the initial
appearance.
3. Initial Appearance Before a Magistrate Judge
The magistrate judge's evaluation of a defendant during his
initial appearance often holds the most weight in determining
whether to commit that defendant for a competency evaluation.
While the magistrate judge has the benefit of the pretrial services
report, as well as any motions filed by defense counsel or by the
prosecutor that may bring potential competency issues to light, it is
her own observations that she must rely upon in making her
determination. As her career on the bench progresses, a magistrate
judge will presumably grow more adept at making determinations
as to which defendants' competence need further examination as
hundreds, and perhaps thousands, of defendants will make initial
appearances in her courtroom. In this arena, there is no substitute
for experience, as magistrate judges are not specifically trained or
given formal guidance on evaluating competence during initial
appearances. They must rely on their own instincts and powers of
observation in determining which defendants need closer attention.
This can be especially difficult to discern when defendants are able
to successfully answer the judge's questions, despite having no real
understanding of the proceedings or charges against them.
B. Challenges to the Current System
The defendant's initial appearance before a magistrate judge
serves as a safety net to catch those defendants who may be
incompetent as early as possible in the course of the proceedings
against them. While there are other, perhaps more reliable, means
of identifying competence issues early on, defendants still slip
through the cracks. The pretrial services officer may not identify
any issue of competence from her interaction with a defendant, as
her questions are very straightforward and do not require much
more than rote recitation of a defendant's background.
Additionally, while defense counsel can be integral in flagging
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competence issues for the court, counsel rarely has the opportunity
to observe a defendant before, or even at, their initial appearance,
or she may be reluctant to share information that could violate the
attorney-client privilege. Despite the large role an initial
appearance may play in flagging or alleviating competency
concerns, training received by magistrate judges-who are charged
with making these initial evaluations by federal law--in this area is
almost nonexistent. New magistrate judges are required to hold
initial appearances during which they must identify those
defendants who may be incompetent to stand trial, perhaps having
no prior exposure to criminal defendants or parties having little in
the way of higher education. Drawing a line between a defendant
who is unable to understand the proceedings and assist counsel
with his own defense and one who simply does not have the same
level of understanding that one might expect from a high school
graduate may be quite difficult to an inexperienced arbiter.
Without training, each magistrate judge must rely on her own
"instinctual discernment" and is given very little guidance to help
her on her way.
C. Potential Solutions
There is one obvious solution that could improve the likelihood
that defendants who are incompetent to stand trial will be properly
identified prior to trial, while preventing those who are competent
from being detained unnecessarily. This obvious and immediate
solution is to introduce training for magistrate judges in the area of
identifying competency issues. Additional solutions may include
some form of voluntary training in the form of Continuing Legal
Education that may assist both prosecutors and defense counsel in
identifying which defendants may need competency evaluations;
assignment of counsel prior to the initial appearance; intervention
with the court by the pretrial services officer before the day of the
initial appearance; and reinforcement of the ability for competency
issues to be raised throughout the pretrial period, not just at the
initial appearance.
As of the date of this publication, the authors are unaware of
any formal materials distributed to magistrate judges to assist them
in making determinations about competency concerns during
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initial appearances.' 0' They propose that such materials be added
to the curriculum for new magistrate judges and that a written
curriculum be provided for incumbent judges. These materials
should provide general guidance to magistrate judges in how to
structure initial appearances, which questions are likely to elicit
answers that will shed light on a defendant's state of mind, which
answers should provoke further questioning, and options that are
available to those defendants whom the judge thinks would benefit
from further observation or from a competency determination.
Thematically, the materials should focus on the initial appearance
as more than a mere formality with a rigid script (notwithstanding
the need for guidance in how to structure an initial appearance
generally; the focus here is on flexibility and follow-up if any
defendant's answer raises any flags with the judge) if it is to serve
the purpose for which it was intended. Several case studies with
their respective outcomes would be necessary to demonstrate the
fine line that is being drawn with respect to competence, which
may have a significant impact on a defendant who will either be
detained for a competency determination, or who will remain free
during the pretrial period (provided he is not being detained for
other reasons). A reminder of the potential outcomes for a
defendant and how these outcomes impact a defendant's
constitutional rights, as earlier described in this article, would
make an excellent conclusion as it will drive home the importance
of these sometimes repetitive and brief proceedings.
101. The authors have reviewed the materials provided to new magistrate
judges, as well as confirmed that no such materials exist with the Magistrate
Judges Division.
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